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ABSTRACT By performing in-network caching, Internet Service Providers (ISPs) allow Content Providers
(CPs) to serve contents from locations closer to users. In this way, the pressure of content delivery on ISPs’
network is alleviated, and the users’ Quality-of-Experience (QoE) improved. Due to its impact on QoE,
caching has been recently considered as a form of traffic prioritization in the debate on Network Neutrality
(NN). A possible approach to perform NN-compliant caching consists in assigning the same portion of
cache storage to all the CPs. However, this static subdivision does not consider the different popularities
of the CPs’ contents and is therefore inefficient. Alternatively, the cache can be subdivided among the CPs
proportionally to the popularity of their contents. However, CPs consider this information private and are
reluctant to disclose it. In this work, we propose a protocol to perform a popularity-driven subdivision of the
caches’ storage in a privacy-preserving and network-neutral fashion. The protocol is based on the Shamir
Secret Sharing (SSS) scheme and is designed to ensure a NN-compliant subdivision of the caches while
preserving the privacy of both CPs and ISP (i.e., contents’ popularity and caches’ size are not disclosed).
Through dynamic simulation, we show that the popularity-driven cache subdivision (enforced by using our
protocol) outperforms several baseline approaches in terms of overall network Resource Occupation (RO)
and caching Hit-Ratios. Thanks to our numerical results, we observe that the frequency of execution of the
protocol has a significant impact on the RO, and that the ISP can tune this frequency to minimize its RO
while introducing an acceptable data overhead. Because of this tuning, several CPs may experience a loss
with respect to the hit-ratio that they would obtain by independently choosing the frequency of execution.
This loss is very limited, and the employment of the protocol is therefore beneficial to all the involved parties,
especially since, by using it, CPs are guaranteed that the ISP behaves in a network-neutral manner.
INDEX TERMS Network neutrality, privacy, content providers, privacy-preserving caching.
I. INTRODUCTION
Online video streaming, especially Video-on-Demand (VoD),
has been a main driving force for the recent escalation in
the overall Internet traffic, both for fixed and mobile users.
Cisco predicts that, by 2022, 82% of the total Internet traffic
will be generated by the distribution of video contents [1],
which are owned by over-the-top Content Providers (CPs)
and distributed to users connected thanks to an Internet Ser-
vice Provider (ISP).
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and
approving it for publication was Donghyun Kim .
To cope with VoD traffic growth, ISPs exploit network
caching to keep network-resource occupation low and to
provide users with improved QoE (achieved by lower-
ing retrieval latency and congestion probability [2]). Using
caching, portions of CPs’ content catalogues (mainly popular
contents) can be served from locations closer to end-users
(i.e., the caches). Therefore, by establishing a subdivision
of the available cache storage capacity among the CPs,
the ISP can significantly affect the users’ QoE. Hence,
caching can be regarded as a form of discriminatory traffic
prioritization and it has recently emerged in the debate on
Network Neutrality (NN) [3]–[5].
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FIGURE 1. High-Level representation of the proposed idea of
NN-compliant caching: CPs are entitled to receive a portion of storage
proportional to their popularity.
In brief, NN is the legislative principle according to which
ISPs are allowed to prioritize a class of traffic only based on
its performance requirements. For example, the traffic gener-
ated by a VoIP call can be treated with higher priority with
respect to e-mail exchange, but not with respect to another
call. As far as caching is concerned, however, all the traffic
is generated by the same class of contents (e.g., video) and,
to the best of our knowledge, there is no current agreement
on the definition of NN-compliant caching. A possible view
of NN-compliant caching [3], [5] requires the ISP to reserve
CPs portions of storage proportional to their contents’ popu-
larity. A high-level representation of this concept is depicted
in Fig. 1. An example of this type of subdivision, that we
refer to as popularity-driven, is the following: given a cache
server that can store an average number of 1000 contents,
a CP that owns 500 out the 1000 most requested contents
from the users of the ISP is assigned 50% of the available
cache storage. Consistently with our previous works [4], [5],
we consider the popularity-driven subdivision to be both NN-
compliant and effective. In fact, it is NN-compliant since it
guarantees the CPs a neutral treatment (because the storage
is assigned only based on their attractiveness and not on
arbitrary forms of agreement with the ISP), but also effective
for the ISP, that experiences the highest reduction of its
network resource occupation when the most popular contents
are served directly from its area. For a better understanding,
we refer the reader to Ref. [4], where we presented a numer-
ical analysis on how caching can be discriminatory towards
the CPs.
On the other hand, compliance to such NN principles
would require the ISP to obtain information about contents’
popularity, which is unlikely as CPs are increasingly encrypt-
ing their contents to protect users’ privacy. To cope with this
issue, we propose a privacy-preserving protocol by which the
ISP can divide its cache storage proportionally to the popu-
larities of CPs’ contents. More specifically, the contributions
of our work are listed in the following.
• We propose a protocol based on the Shamir Secret
Sharing (SSS) scheme that is designed to protect both
CPs’ and ISP’s privacy requirements, as ISP and CPs
are not required to exchange with each other sensitive
information (e.g., the capacities of the caches and the
popularities of contents).
• We define an architecture suitable for the execution
of the protocol. This architecture is composed of an
ISP, several CPs and a regulator authority (RA), which
ensures that each CP is assigned a fair amount of storage
and that no illicit collusion occurs among CPs and ISP.
• We develop a discrete-event-based simulator for
dynamic VoD traffic provisioning, that we use to per-
form the comparison between the proposed protocol and
two baseline approaches, namely the (i) static and the
(ii) network-resource-driven subdivisions.
• We perform extensive simulations and measure the per-
formance of the various approaches in terms of the
network Resource Occupation (RO), measured by the
ISP, and the Hit-Rate measured by the ISP and CPs.
The obtained results show that our proposed protocol
allows minimizing network RO and maximizing the overall
hit-ratio with respect to baseline approaches and, unlike the
baselines, it also guarantees a NN-compliant storage subdi-
vision. Finally, we evaluate the overhead the protocol intro-
duces, which may be considered negligible compared to the
reduction of RO that the protocol provides.
A. RELATED WORK
1) NETWORK-NEUTRAL CACHING
Existing literature on NN mainly focuses on legislative
aspects [6] and technical approaches for monitoring its ful-
fillment [7], which is widely-recognized as a rather difficult
task. Along this line, it is often argued (e.g., in [8]) that NN
can be enforced only if network management becomes more
transparent to ISPs customers. In this work, we propose a
protocol that guarantees a fair and transparent treatment to
CPs that apply caching on an ISP network. While research
concerning regulations of NN-compliant traffic prioritization
is quite extensive and mature [6], NN aspects of caching
have been rarely considered. To the best of our knowledge,
caching has been considered as a potentially-discriminatory
process only in Ref. [3], [4], where possible definitions of
NN-compliant caching are proposed. These works, how-
ever, do not propose any technical implementation for the
enforcement of NN-compliant caching. Ref. [4] observes that
the enforcement of NN-compliant caching is prevented by
the wide adoption of encryption. In this work, we focus
on the technical implementation of a protocol that enables
the enforcement of NN-compliant caching. Specifically,
we extend our work in [5], in which we designed a protocol
that guarantees (i) NN compliance, (ii) scalability (e.g., with
respect to the number of CPs) and (iii) privacy (CPs and
ISP are not required to exchange sensitive information with
each other). The main limitations of the protocol in [5] are
that the available cache storage is not fully utilized and all
the contents are required to be of the same size. Both these
limitations are overcome in the extended version described
in this paper.
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2) PRIVACY-PRESERVING CACHING
Ref. [9] proposes two different approaches for ISPs to effi-
ciently cache contents in presence of encryption. In the first
approach, the ISP infers information about popularity by
analyzing the occurrences of pseudonomys associated with
the contents and selects the contents to be cached accordingly.
In [10] it is observed that this approach does not fully protect
privacy, and guidelines are provided to improve it. In [11],
the ISP reserves a slice of cache storage and leaves each
CP manage independently its slice remotely. To compute the
slice of storage to allocate to a CP, several approaches are
proposed such as by localizing the geographic distribution
of requests in a privacy-preserving fashion [12] or by ana-
lyzing the aggregate hit-rates experienced by each CP [11].
In our protocol, however, we compute the subdivision of the
storage to be allocated to a CP meeting more challenging
privacy requirements (i.e., the ISP is not required to obtain
the hit-rate related to each CP) and, differently from [11],
we guarantee that the ISP actually divides its cache in a
NN-fashion. To achieve this objective, we base our protocol
on consolidated cryptographic primitives, namely the Paillier
cryptosystem and the SSS scheme (explained in detail in
Section II). An in-depth description of schemes constructed
over SSS can be found in [13]–[15].
B. PAPER ORGANIZATION
The paper is structured as follows. In Section II we provide
background on the building blocks of the proposed proto-
col. A definition of NN-compliant caching, along with a
formal problem statement is presented in Section III. The
entities involved in the execution of the proposed protocol,
their objectives and the security assumptions are presented in
Section IV. Section V describes the proposed protocol. The
simulations settings and the event-driven simulator employed
to perform the experiments are described in Section VI. The
obtained results and the relative discussion are presented in
Section VII. Finally, Section VIII concludes the paper.
II. BACKGROUND
A. PAILLIER CRYPTOSYSTEM
Paillier [16] is a type of asymmetric cryptosystem, whose
public and private keys are referred in the rest of the paper
to as pubk and privk , respectively. Paillier has additive homo-
morphic properties, i.e., the summation of two (or more)
cypertexts is the encryption of the summation of the rela-
tive plaintexts. For example, given two pairs of plaintexts
m1, m2 and the relative ciphertexts c1 = Enc(m1, pubk ),
c2 = Enc(m2, pubk ), it holds that m = Dec(c, privk ), where
m = m1 + m2 and c = c1 + c2.
B. SHAMIR SECRET SHARING
A (W ,T ) Shamir Secret Sharing (SSS) [17] is a crypto-
graphic scheme that allows to share a secret s among a set
of W participants in such a way that its reconstruction can
only be performed by the collusion of any subset of at least T
participants. In the rest of the paper, we use the notation JcKP
to indicate the share of s assigned to the participant P.
The SSS is based on the principle that any polynomial
of degree T − 1 can be perfectly reconstructed from the
knowledge of T points that it intercepts. Let s ∈ Zq be the
secret (with q a prime number greater than all the possible
secrets) and let v1, v2, . . . , vT−1 be the coefficients of the
polynomial, which are random integers uniformly distributed
in [0, q − 1]. The participant P receives JcKP = (xP, yP),
with xP an integer number (distinct for each participant) and
yP = s+ u1xP+ u2x2P+ . . .+ uT−1xT−1P . The reconstruction
of s can be performed by means of interpolation algorithms,
e.g., the Lagrange interpolation.
C. PROTOCOL BUILDING BLOCKS
During the execution of the protocol, the operations per-
formed over secrets shared with SSS are based on three main
atomic operators, namely the equality-test, the comparison
and the multiplication. The equality-test (resp., comparison)
operator takes as input the shares Js1K and Js2K and returnsJ1K if s1 = s2 (resp., s1 ≤ s2) and J0K otherwise. The
multiplication takes as input Js1K and Js2K and returns Js1 ·s2K.
As for the equality-test, we employ the equality-test with-
out bit decomposition described in [14]. The equality-test
operator serves as the main building block for the imple-
mentation of the aggregate-if-equal algorithm [13], that
takes in input (Js1], Jv1]) and (Js2K, Jv2K), i.e., two pairs of
(secret,value) in secret shared form and returns (Js1], Jv1 +
v2K) and (Js2K, J0K) if s1 = s2, whereas the pairs are left
unchanged otherwise. In our work, we employ another algo-
rithm presented in [13] that efficiently aggregates a sequence
ofM (secret,value) pairs in secret shared form by recursively
applying the aggregate-if-equal algorithm forM logM times.
Our protocol requires to perform several multiplications of
secrets. However, the SSS is not homomorphic with respect to
the multiplication (i.e., given the shares of two secrets s1 and
s2, Js1 · s2K 6= Js1K · Js2K). To address this issue, our protocol
exploits the multiplication scheme proposed in [18]. This
scheme requires the parties involved in the multiplication to
share with each other a multiplicative triple JaK, JbK, JcK such
that a · b = c. The security of the multiplication scheme
described in [18] is based on the assumption that none of the
involved parties is able to obtain the secrets a, b, c from the
relative shares JaK, JbK, JcK. The shares of the multiplication
triple can be pre-computed in a secure manner using the
scheme proposed in [19].
III. NN-COMPLIANT CACHING
A. DEFINITION
In Ref. [4] we advocated the inclusion of caching in the
current debate about NN and provided guidelines to reach a
possible definition of NN-compliant caching. In this work,
we consider caching to be network-neutral if the available
ISP’s cache storage is divided among the CPs proportionally
to the popularity of their contents. This definition allows to
balance the requirements of NN (i.e., CPs are treated based
on an unbiased criterion instead of on arbitrary forms of
agreements) and the legitimate interests of the ISP, which is
willing to minimize its network RO in return of the monetary
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investment done to buy andmaintain the caching system [20].
In the next subsection, we formally present the problem of
computing a popularity-driven subdivision of the storage and
we briefly introduce the protocol proposed to solve it in a
privacy-preserving manner.
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT
We consider a scenario where a sequence of N requestsR =
{r1, r2, . . . , rN } is issued from the users within the area of an
ISP towards a set of K CPs. The ISP owns a caching system
composed of several cache servers. The generic n-th cache
is characterized by the size of its storage S(n)cache, expressed in
bytes, and by an average number of contents that it can store,
i.e., N (n)cache. Assuming that the average size of the contents is
sˆ, it is possible to derive N (n)cache as N
(n)
cache = b S
(n)
cache
sˆ c.
Following the definition of NN-compliant caching given in
Section III-A, the total storage of the n-th cache (i.e., S(n)cache)
should be divided among the K CPs proportionally to the
popularity of their contents. Specifically, if the n-th cache can
store, on average, N (n)cache contents, the k-th CP is entitled to
receive a percentage of the total storage proportional to the
number of its contents belonging to theN (n)cache most requested
contents from the area of the ISP. The portion of storage γ (n)k
that the k-th CP is worth receiving is computed as:
γ
(n)
k =
zk∑K
j=1 zj
· S(n)cache, 1 ≤ k ≤ K (1)
where S(n)cache is the size of the n-th cache, while zj is the
number of contents offered by the j-th CP whose popularity
rank is below N (n)cache (we recall that the most popular content
has rank equal to 0).
To compute γ (n)k , 1 ≤ k ≤ K , the ISP and the CPs
are required to exchange with each other information that
are deemed confidential, such as the size of the caches and
the popularity of the contents. The protocol that we propose
allows to perform this computation in a privacy-preserving
manner. In the next Section, we describe the roles and objec-
tives of the entities involved in the execution of the protocol.
IV. ARCHITECTURE
The proposed protocol is executed by three entities, namely
an ISP, the CPs and a Regulator Authority (RA). This
Section is devoted to the description of the involved parties,
their caching objectives, privacy requirements, and security
models.
A. INTERNET SERVICE PROVIDER
The ISP provides Internet connectivity to its users and it
is the owner of the caching system exploited by the CPs.
Concerning the execution of our protocol, it has the following
objectives/requirements.
Caching Objectives: the main performance objective of
the ISP is the minimization of its overall network resource
occupation (RO). RO is defined as the amount of resources
occupied to deliver all requests (more specifically, RO is
the product of the number of network links traversed by the
duration of a request by the bit-rate of the requested content).
Privacy Requirements: ISPs commonly consider confi-
dential the information related to their infrastructure [21].
In this work, we assume that ISP is not willing to disclose the
size of its cache servers, as this may provide precious infor-
mation on its monetary investment [22]. More specifically,
the RA and all the K CPs should not learn any information
about the size of the n-th cache (i.e., S(n)cache). CPk , 1 ≤ k ≤ K
can learn, at most, a lower bound γ (n)k , which is obtained as
a licit output of the protocol. In addition, the RA should not
learn γ (n)k , 1 ≤ k ≤ K .
Security Model: we model the ISP as an honest-but-
curious entity, that executes the protocol truthfully but tries
to obtain as many information as possible from its transcripts
(e.g., the ISP may try to infer the popularity of a content from
the secrets’ shares that it receives). A variation of the protocol
that can deal with a dishonest ISP (i.e., an ISP that lies in
its inputs) is described in Section V-F, where we present a
subprotocol managed by the RA to perform anti-cheating
operations.
B. CONTENT PROVIDERS
WeconsiderK CPs, referred to asCPk , 1 ≤ k ≤ K . A generic
CPk offers a catalogue of contents Ck , which is assumed to
be completely stored on a datacenter located outside the area
of the ISP. As proposed in [11], each CP remotely manages
its portion of cache storage (e.g., by selecting the contents
to be cached) and directly serves its users from the cache.
Without loss of generality, we assume that the catalogues of
the K CPs do not have any content in common (i.e., single
catalogues’ entries do not overlap). Moreover, we assume
that the catalogues of the K CPs are not equally attractive
towards the users, i.e., some catalogues are much more pop-
ular than others [23] and that users can retrieve contents from
any of such catalogues. We refer to the overall catalogue
(i.e., the composition of all the CPs catalogues) to as C.
Caching Objectives: a CP aims to maximize its personal
Hit-Rate (i.e., the percentage of requests directed to it that are
served from the caches), as this results in an improvement of
the overall QoE that it can offer to its users [2].
Privacy Requirements: we assume that the CPs aim to
protect the following information:
1) Confidentiality of the requests: given the generic
request r issued by user u toward CPk , the ISP, the RA
and all the CPs (except CPk itself) should not be able
to identify the requested content with non-neglibigle
probability.
2) Contents’ popularity: given two contents cx and cy,
the ISP, the RA and all the CPs should not be able to say
if cx is more popular than cy with non-negligible proba-
bility. In case both cx and cy belong to the generic CPk ,
only that CP can know which content is more popular
than the other. It is important to remark that disclos-
ing the information about contents’ popularity would
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reveal extremely confidential insights about the com-
petition between the CPs (e.g., how the market shares
are distributed among the CPs).
3) Number of contents and their size: the ISP, the RA and
all the CPs should not be able to discover the total
number of contents owned by the CPs, as well as their
sizes.
Security Model: our protocol guarantees a popularity-
driven subdivision of the storage, but its effectiveness is based
on the assumption that CPs honestly execute it. In fact, if CPs
altered their data during the execution of the protocol (e.g.,
by lying about a requested content), the obtained subdivision
would not reflect the correct proportion among CPs’ popu-
larity. Driven by the idea that each CP has scarce knowledge
about the popularity patterns of the competitors, we assume
that it is also not able to alter its data in such a way to obtain
a portion of cache storage larger that what it is entitled to
receive. Moreover, we assume that the CPs do not have the
economical incentives to collude with each other. Hence, CPs
can be considered honest.
C. REGULATOR AUTHORITY
The Regulator Authority (RA) is considered a honest entity
that engages with the ISP and the CPs only the legitimate
exchange of information envisioned by the protocol. The
RA has the main objective of ensuring a NN-compliant
storage subdivision (i.e., popularity-driven) division and acts
as a guarantor that CPs’ and ISP’s privacy is not violated.
Moreover, the RA is the only entity that knows the private
key that can be used to decrypt the data ciphered with the
Paillier cryptosystem.
V. THE NN-COMPLIANT PROTOCOL
The NN-compliant protocol involves a set of operations that
are mainly performed over the shares of the secrets that ISP,
CPs and RA generate using SSS and exchange among each
other. We consider a (2,2) SSS, i.e., only a collusion of 2 out
of 2 participants allows to reconstruct the secrets.
The protocol works in four main phases: preliminary oper-
ations, share collection, operations on shares and caching.
The preliminary operations are needed to make the parties
learn data (e.g., the shares of the multiplication triples) that
will be needed during the execution of the protocol. Hence,
such operations can be performed in an off-line fashion. The
successive three phases last for a period of Tcol , Top and
Tcaching, respectively, and are cyclically repeated as depicted
in Figure 2. In the same figure it is also possible to notice that
the share collection and the operations on shares phases start
simultaneously after the end of the previous share collection
phase and that, by construction, Tcol = Tcaching. We describe
the aforementioned phases in the following subsections.
A. PRELIMINARY OPERATIONS
Preliminary operation aim is to give the ISP the information
on the average size of CPs’ contents and to compute the
FIGURE 2. Phases of the execution of the NN-compliant protocol.
FIGURE 3. Secure computation of the average contents’ size.
shares of the multiplication triples required to perform secret
multiplications.
1) SECURE COMPUTATION OF THE AVERAGE DIMENSION
OF THE CONTENTS
First, the ISP learns sˆ, i.e., the average size of the contents
owned by the CPs. This value is needed to obtain the aver-
age number of contents that a cache can store (i.e., Ncache)
from its size Scache (see Eq. 1). This phase is designed to
allow the CPs to not disclose to the ISP neither the number
nor the size of their contents. The k-th CP uses the public
key pubk to encrypt (i) the sum of the sizes of its contents
(i.e., Sk ) and (ii) the number of contents of its catalogue
(i.e., Nk ) by means of the Paillier cryptosystem briefly
reviewed in Section II-A. Both Enc(Sk ) and Enc(Nk ) are sent
to the RA. This operation is performed by all the K CPs.
Then, the RA computes
∑K
k=1 Enc(Nk ) and
∑K
k=1 Enc(Sk )
that, due to the additive homomorphic properties of the Pail-
lier cryptosystem, correspond to the encryption of the total
number of contents and to the overall summation of their
sizes, respectively. The RA, which is assumed to be the only
entity who knows the private key privk , successively decrypts
the two values and obtain
∑K
k=1Nk and
∑K
k=1 Sk . From these
values, it is then simple to compute the average size of the
contents as sˆ =
∑K
k=1 Sk∑K
k=1Nk
, which is sent by the RA to the ISP.
A representation of this phase is depicted in Fig. 3.
2) SECURE COMPUTATION OF A MULTIPLICATION TRIPLE
The ISP and the RA compute the shares of a multiplica-
tive triple (JaKISP, JaKRA,JbKISP, JbKRA,JcKISP, JcKRA such that
c= a·b) by means of the scheme presented in [19] and briefly
reviewed in Section II.
B. COLLECTION OF THE SHARES
Upon a new request (say ri) for content cj ∈ C, the owner
CP generates two shares of the identifier (e.g., the name) of
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content cj, i.e., JriKISP = JcjKISP and JriKRA = JcjKRA, and
sends them to the ISP and the RA, respectively. We assume
that the ISP and the RA can always associate a share with
the owner CP (e.g., by means of its IP address). At the
end of this phase, the ISP and the RA know the shares of
all the requests R issued during the share collection phase,
i.e., SISP = {JriKISP} and SRA = {JriKRA}, ∀ri ∈ R. Notice
that, even if the same content cj is requested in both r1 and
r2, it holds that Jr1K 6= Jr2K, which prevents the ISP from
inferring the popularity patterns of the CPs. The operations
performed in this phase are shown in Subprotocol 1.
Subprotocol 1 Collecting the Shares of the Requested
Contents’ Identifiers
Input: RA: None
ISP: None
CPs: Each CPk inputs the subset of contents’ requests
R = {r1, . . . , rN } directed to it
Output: RA learns JriKRA, 1 ≤ i ≤ N
ISP learns JriKISP, 1 ≤ i ≤ N
CPs learn nothing
1: for 1 ≤ i ≤ N do
2: Let CPk be the owner of the content requested in ri
3: CPk generates JriKISP and JriKRA
4: CPk → RA: JriKRA
5: CPk → ISP: JriKISP
6: end for
C. OPERATIONS ON SHARES
Since the ISP and the RA perform the same operations on
their set of shares, we omit the apex unless necessary and
we describe the operations performed over the abstract set
of shares S = {JriK,∀ri ∈ R} that have been collected
during the collection phase. The operations performed over
the shares are shown in Subprotocol 2 and described in the
following:
1) AGGREGATE IF EQUAL
Given a set S = {JriK,∀i ∈ R} containing the shares relative
to the contents of N requests, the objective of this phase is
to obtain the share JniK,∀i ∈ {1, . . . ,N }, where ni is total
number of requests of the content requested in ri. To perform
this operation, we employ the algorithm presented in [13] and
briefly reviewed in Section II, that computes the aggregation
of a set of N elements (in the form of secret shares of key
and value) by recursively executing the aggregate-if-equal
algorithm N logN times. In our application of the protocol,
the key is the share of the content cj hidden in the i-th request
ri, i.e., JriK = JcjK, while the value associated is the share
of 1 for all the requests. Since both the ISP and the CPs
might be interested in altering the value (as this would favour
some contents over others and ultimately affect the caching
process), we mandate the RA to generate J1KRA and J1KISP
at each request. At the end of this phase, the ISP and the
RA obtain the respective shares of JniK,∀i ∈ {1, . . . ,N }.
Subprotocol 2 Performing Operations on the Shares
Input: RA: JriKRA, 1 ≤ i ≤ N
ISP: JriKISP, 1 ≤ i ≤ N
Output: RA learns JzkKRA, 1 ≤ k ≤ K
ISP learns JzkKISP, 1 ≤ k ≤ K
1: RA generates two shares of the constant 1: J1KRA andJ1KISP
2: ISP generates two shares of the constant Ncache:JNcacheKRA and JNcacheKISP
3: RA→ ISP: J1KISP
4: ISP→ RA: JNcacheKRA
RA and ISP locally execute for j = RA and j = ISP,
respectively
1: Execute the aggregate-if-equal algorithm over the set
{(JriKj, J1Kj) , 1 ≤ i ≤ N } and obtain {JniKj, 1 ≤ i ≤ N }
2: Execute the comparison algorithm between all the pairs
of elements of the set {JniKj, 1 ≤ i ≤ N } and obtain
{JpiiKj, 1 ≤ i ≤ N }
3: for 1 ≤ i ≤ N do
4: Execute the comparison algorithm on(JpiiKj, JNcacheKj) and obtain JβiKj
5: The CPk to which ri is directed is identified
6: Updating of the number of contents belonging to CPk
whose popularity rank pi < Ncache :JzkKj← JzkKj + JβiKj
7: end for
2) RANK COMPUTATION
From the previous phase, ISP and RA have obtained a setJniK,∀i ∈ {1, . . . ,N } containing the shares of the number
of occurrences for each requested content. With these data in
hand, they aim at computing pii ∈ [0,N − 1], i.e., the rank of
the content requested in ri, wherepii increaseswith decreasing
popularity of the associated content (i.e., pi = 0 for the most
popular content).
To perform this task, all the shares JniK,∀i ∈ {1, . . . ,N }
need to be compared with each other, for a total of N 2 exe-
cutions of the comparison algorithm mentioned in Section II.
We recall that the algorithm takes in input two shares Jx1K
and Jx2K and returns J1K if x1 ≤ x2, and J0K otherwise.
Considering that J1K = 1 − J0K and J0K = 1 − J1K (due to
the additive homomorphic properties of SSS), it is possible
to assign the share J1K to the lower value (say x1) and the
share J0K to the higher one (say x2) with a single execution of
the comparison algorithm. Hence, the complexity is reduced
from N 2 to
(N
2
)
executions of the comparison algorithm. The
rank pii can then be computed by summing up the results,
in secret shared form, of the relative comparisons as JpiiK =∑N−1
x=1,x 6=iJli,xK, where li,x = 0 if ni ≤ nx (and 1 otherwise).
Notice that, if ri is the request relative to the most popular
content, then li,x = 0,∀x (because its number of occurrences
is higher than all the others) and, as expected, pii = 0.
Once the shares of ranks JpiiK,∀i ∈ {1, . . . ,N } have been
obtained, ISP andRAneed to compute the share of the portion
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of cache that each CP is expected to receive. To this aim,
the rank of each content needs to be compared with the size
of the cache and, if pii ≤ Ncache, the CP to which ri is directed
is entitled to store one content. Since the ISP wants to protect
the information about its cache size, it generates 2 sharesJNcacheKISP and JNcacheKRA, which can be used to perform
a comparison with JpiiK,∀i ∈ [1, . . . ,N ] by means of the
comparison algorithm. The result of the i-th comparison isJβiK, with βi = 1 if pii ≤ Ncache (and 0 otherwise).
By repeating this operation for all the requests directed
towards CPk , i.e., Rk , ISP and RA obtain the share of
the number of most popular contents owned by CPk asJzk ] =∑i∈Rk JβiK.
D. CACHING
Subprotocol 3 Calculating the Portion of Cache Storage to
Allocate to Each CP
Input: RA: JScacheKRA, JzkKRA, 1 ≤ k ≤ K
ISP: JScacheKISP, JzkKISP, 1 ≤ k ≤ K
CPs: None
Output: RA learns nothing
ISP learns γk = rv·zk ·Scacherv·∑Kj=1 zj , 1 ≤ k ≤ K
Each CPk learns γk = rv·zk ·Scacherv·∑Kj=1 zj
1: ISP and RA compute the shares JrvKISP and JrvKRA of a
secret random integer rv using the scheme of [14]
2: ISP and RA compute Jrv ·∑Kj=1 zjKISP and Jrv ·∑K
j=1 zjKRA using the multiplication protocol of [18]
3: for k ∈ {1, . . . ,K } do
4: RA→ CPk : Jrv ·∑Kj=1 zjKRA
5: ISP computes Jrv · zk · ScacheKISP
6: RA computes Jrv · zk · ScacheKRA
7: RA→ CPk : Jrv · zk · ScacheKRA
8: end for
9: for k ∈ {1, . . . ,K } do
10: CPk → ISP: Jrv ·∑Kj=1 zjKRA and Jrv · zk · ScacheKRA
11: ISP→ CPk : Jrv ·∑Kj=1 zjKISP and Jrv · zk · ScacheKISP
12: end for
13: for k ∈ {1, . . . ,K } do
14: ISP and CPk reconstruct the secret rv · ∑Kj=1 zj ←(Jrv ·∑Kj=1 zjKRA, Jrv ·∑Kj=1 zjKISP)
15: ISP and CPk reconstruct the secret rv · zk · Scache ←(Jrv · zk · ScacheKRA, Jrv · zk · ScacheKISP)
16: end for
17: for k ∈ {1, . . . ,K } do
18: ISP computes γk = rv·zk ·Scacherv·∑Kj=1 zj
19: CPk computes γk = rv·zk ·Scacherv·∑Kj=1 zj
20: end for
We remind that CPk is entitled to receive a portion of
storage γk = zk∑K
j=1 zj
· Scache. The ISP and the RA know
their shares JScacheK and JzkK, 1 ≤ k ≤ K and could recover
zk ,
∑K
j=1 zj and Scache and obtain from them the value γk .
The exchange of shares and the operations performed on them
to compute the cache storage subdivision are described in the
following and shown in Subprotocol 3.
However, we prevent the ISP and the RA from directly
reconstructing these secrets since (i) from
∑K
j=1 zj the RA
could obtain a good estimate of the size of the cache Scache
and (ii) from zk , 1 ≤ k ≤ K it would discover the number
of contents owned by each CP whose popularity rank is less
than Nc. Instead, ISP and RA employ the scheme described
in [14] to obtain the shares of a random integer JrvKISP andJrvKRA without learning rv itself. With these values in hands,
they then learn, using the multiplicative protocol proposed
in [18], Jrv · zk · ScacheK, 1 ≤ k ≤ K and Jrv · ∑Kj=1 zjK.
Notice that these values represent the shares of the numerator
and denominator of zk∑K
j=1 zj
, respectively, which have been
masked with the same value rv to keep the ratio between them
unchanged (and equal to γk ).
Then, the RA sends Jrv · zk · ScacheKRA and Jrv ·∑Kj=1 zjKRA
to the corresponding k-th CP, which exchanges with the ISP
their shares to recover rv · zk · Scache and rv ·∑Kj=1 zj. From
these two reconstructed secrets, both the ISP and the k-th CP
compute the amount of storage destined to CPk :
γk = rv · zk · Scache
rv ·∑Kj=1 zj (2)
Notice that the k-th CP learns nothing more that its allo-
cated storage. For example, it does not learn the percentage
of storage it is assigned, from which it would have derived
the size of the cache Scache.
At this point, the k-th CP can start caching its contents
in the received storage portion. Notice also that, whilst the
popularity-based caches’ subdivision is computed by per-
forming operations on the shares relative to contents’ requests
(i.e., the proposed protocol is designed to work at the content
level) caching strategies are successively applied by the CPs
on a chunk-level basis, as further described in Section VI-A.
In Fig. 4 we depict the most salient shares that the involved
parties exchange with each other during the last three phases
of execution of the protocol, namely collection of shares,
operations on shares and caching.
E. FULLFILMENT OF PRIVACY REQUIREMENTS
1) ISP’S PRIVACY REQUIREMENTS
We remind that neither the RA nor the CPs are allowed to
obtain the size of the ISP’s caches (i.e., Scache) and that the
RA is not allowed to obtain the portion of storage given to
CPk , i.e., γk , 1 ≤ k ≤ K .
During the execution of the protocol (in the rank computa-
tion phase, precisely) the RA obtains the share JNcacheK. Since
SSS is proved secure under the information-theoretic secu-
rity model [17], this share provides absolutely no additional
information on the relative secret. Hence, the RA does not
discover the size of the cache. Then, in the caching phase,
the RA learns Jrv · zk · ScacheK and Jrv ·∑Kj=1 zjK. Under the
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FIGURE 4. Main shares learnt by ISP, CPs and RA during the execution of
the NN-compliant protocol.
assumption of honest RA, ISP and RA do not exchange their
shares with each other. Hence, the RA does not obtain γk .
During the caching phase, CPk , , 1 ≤ k ≤ K learns
rv · zk · Scache and rv · ∑Kj=1 zj, from which it computes
γk = rv·zk ·Scacherv·∑Kj=1 zj . Notice that the ability of CPk to estimate
Scache is bounded by its ability to assess its popularity with
respect to the popularity of its competitors, which is encoded
in the ratio zk∑K
j=1 zj
. Since we have assumed that each CP has
scarse knowledge about other CPs’ attractiveness, we con-
sider Scache to be protected from the CPs as well.
2) CP’S PRIVACY REQUIREMENTS
Considering the first privacy requirement of the CP, i.e., the
confidentiality of the requests, in the share collection phase
the ISP and the RA receive JriKISP and JriKRA from the CP
towards which the i-th request is issued (say CPk ). As SSS is
information-theoretically secure, it holds that:
P(cj|JriK) = 1Nk , ∀j ∈ {1, . . . ,Nk} (3)
where P(cj|JriK) is the probability that the share JriK refers
to content cj and Nk is the total number of contents owned
by CPk . No CP (except CPk ) obtains JriK from the execution
of the protocol and both the RA and the ISP can identify
the content hidden behind the i-th request with a negligible
probability only. Hence, the first CPs’ privacy requirement is
fulfilled.
Concerning the second privacy requirement, i.e., protection
of contents’ popularity, in the rank computation phase the ISP
and the RA obtain the shares of the number of occurrences
of the content hidden behind the i-th request, i.e., JniK, ∀i.
They then compare the number of occurrences of each pair
of contents (say ci and cx) and obtain the result in secret
shared form (i.e., Jli,xK). Due to the information-theoretically
security properties of SSS, P(li,x = 0) = P(li,x = 1) = 0.5.
Hence, neither the ISP nor the RA can violate the privacy of
contents’ popularity.
Finally, to satisfy the third privacy requirement, the ISP
should not obtain the number and the sizes’ of CPs’ contents.
During the preliminary operations, the ISP only obtains the
average size of contents sˆ, fromwhich it cannot derive neither
the total number of contents, nor their sizes.
F. EXTENSION OF THE PROTOCOL FOR DISHONEST ISP
In this Section, we describe a scenario in which, by mali-
ciously forging its data, the ISP can obtain an unfair subdi-
vision of the cache storage. We then provide an extension of
the protocol to make the RA able to discover if the ISP is
cheating.
The generic cache server is characterized by its size Scache
and by the average number of contents that it can storeNcache,
according to the relation Scache = Ncache · sˆ, being sˆ the
average size of CPs’ contents. Nc determines the number of
contents that the CPs regard as the most popular ones. Just as
an example, let us think of the case of 2 CPs, referred to as
CP1 andCP2, which own contents whose popularity ranks go
from 0 to 49 and from 50 to 99, respectively. If Ncache = 50
contents, then, according to our definition of NN-compliant
caching, the 100% of the total cache storage should be
assigned toCP1. This value drops to 50% if, instead,Ncache =
100 contents. This scenario shows that, by communicating to
the RA the share of a forged Ncache, the ISP is able favour
a specific CP. To address this issue, the RA can compare
sˆ · JNcKRA and JScKRA using the equality-test operator, and ask
the ISP to perform a similar operation. By doing so, RA and
ISP learn the shares JbeqKRA and JbeqKISP, from which they
recover beq that is equal to 1 if the ISP did not forged Ncache,
and 0 otherwise.
VI. DYNAMIC SIMULATIONS FOR VOD CONTENT
CACHING AND DISTRIBUTION
To evaluate the performance of the proposed privacy-
preserving network-neutrality compliant caching protocol,
we develop a discrete-event-driven simulator to perform
dynamic simulations ofVoD content caching and distribution.
In this section, we describe the developed simulator, the VoD
request provisioning process and the general simulation set-
tings.
A. DYNAMIC VoD CONTENT CACHING AND
DISTRIBUTION SIMULATOR
The overall framework of the simulator is described as fol-
lows: Given the network topology, content catalogue charac-
teristics of each CP, locations of caches and the list of stored
contents per CP in each cache, the simulator provisions the
dynamically-arriving VoD-content requests, based on current
network status, and gives as an output the overall amount
of resources occupied to provision contents of a specific CP,
the overall RO of the network and caches’ hit-ratios.
Note that a VoD-content request is provisioned taking
into consideration its chunk-nature, i.e., each VoD request,
according to its duration, consists of a number of chunks
and the chunks are provisioned sequentially. This allows to
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TABLE 1. Table of notations.
have different chunks of the sameVoD request delivered from
different caches, which is basically the case when caches
are dynamically updated, i.e., when contents are pulled out
from or pushed in caches. Specifically, a VoD-chunk request
is described by the tuple r = (tr , Dr , br , m, dr ), where tr is
the request arriving time from node Dr , br is the requested
bit-rate, m is the requested content and dr is the chunk dura-
tion. The simulated VoD-chunk provisioning/deprovisioning
process is described as follows: Upon arrival of a VoD-chunk
request for content m from node Dr , a list of all cache nodes
hosting m (including the video server) is identified. Then,
the nearest cache storing content m delivers the chunk to
nodeDr , considering a path with available bandwidth greater
than or equal to br . The chunk is later deprovisioned at time
ts+ dr deallocating the assigned bandwidth from the utilized
path.
B. NETWORK MODEL AND CACHING SYSTEM
We consider a real ISP metro-aggregation network topology,
depicted in Fig. 5. The network consists of three types of
nodes, namely metro-core backbone nodes, metro-core nodes
and metro-aggregation nodes. We assume that the metro-
core and metro-aggregation nodes are cache-enabled nodes,
i.e., capable of hosting and delivering video contents while
themetro-core backbone nodes are routers connecting the ISP
to the Internet. As for the cache-enabled nodes, we consid-
ered 2 metro-core and 12 metro-aggregation caches whose
locations are highlighted in Fig. 5.
C. TRAFFIC MODEL
Information about contents’ requests is widely considered
sensitive and business relevant by CPs. Hence, public data
sets are rarely available to the research community and
we had to perform our simulations over synthetic traffic
traces, which have been crafted as follows. Based on a
common assumption made in the literature, we consider a
fixed catalogue [24] of contents whose popularities are dis-
tributed according to the Zipf law, i.e., pj = j−α∑M−1
z=0 pz
,∀j ∈
FIGURE 5. Schematic representation of the ISP Network Topology and the
location of caches.
{0, . . . ,M − 1}, where pj is the probability that the j-th
popular content is chosen among the available M videos.
α ∈ [0, 1] is the skew parameter of the Zipf (the number
of scarcely-requested contents increases with increasing α).
Inspired by [25], we also introduce a temporal dynamic to
this popularity distribution. In particular, every 30 minutes
we sum (or subtract, with the same probability) a Poisson-
distributed random variable (with mean value 1) to the pop-
ularity rank of each content cj,∀j ∈ {0, . . . ,M − 1}. Notice
that the described catalogue results from the aggregation of
the single catalogues owned by each CP.
Finally, we consider CPs that offer, on average, contents
of significantly different popularities. Although being a well-
known characteristic of existing CPs (few of which are much
more popular than the others), to our knowledge a contents’
popularity model that take this fact into consideration has
never been proposed in the literature. To fill this gap, we pro-
pose a model that is descibed in the following. We assume
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that the k-th CP is characterized by a gaussian probability
distribution ρ(k)j over the ranks of the overall catalogue with
mean value µk = MK · (k − 12 ) and standard deviation σk =
σ1 + (K − k) · σ2−σ1K , where M and K are the total number
of contents and of CPs, respectively. σ1 and σ2 are tuned
to obtain different degrees of CPs’ popularity, in particular
to model the difference of CPs’ attractiveness towards the
users. To this aim, in Section VII we consider scenarios with
different values of σ1 and σ2.
According to the proposed model, the j-th popular con-
tent of the overall catalogue described above belongs to
the k-th CP with probability P(j, k) = ρ
(k)
j∑K
x=1 ρ
(x)
j
. In this
way, for example, given K = 5 CPs and M = 25000
contents and considering σ1 = MK and σ2 = σ1K , CP1
and CP5 are assigned contents with an average rank of
4369 and 22144, and standard deviations of 3348 and
1946, respectively. This makes the contents offered by
CP5 much less popular than those owned by CP1, on
average.
We assume that the duration of the contents is a random
variable distributed according to a Pareto distribution with
skew parameter equal to 0.25. All the durations are then
normalized between 1200 s and 8400 s. We then assume
the same bit-representation for all the contents to be equal
to 12 Mbits (hence contents have a size that ranges between
1.8 and 12.6 Gbytes).
VII. ILLUSTRATIVE SIMULATIVE RESULTS
A. SIMULATION SETTINGS
In our experiments, we consider three approaches of
cache storage subdivision, namely the popularity-driven,
the resource-occupation-driven and the static subdivisions.
In the first approach, which is enabled by the use of our
protocol, each CP receives a portion of storage proportional
to the popularity of its contents. In the second approach each
CP receives a portion of storage proportional to the RO the
the delivery of its contents generates within the network of
the ISP. In the third approach, all the CPs receive the same
amount of storage.
To compare the performance of these approaches, we per-
form simulations on two different scenarios, the first char-
acterized by K = 5 CPs and Mˆ = 5000, and the second
by K = 10 CPs and Mˆ = 5000, for values of Tcol ∈
{10, 20, 30, . . . , 100} minutes. In each simulation, we sim-
ulate the arrival of 43000 VoD requests generated according
to the traffic model described in Sec. VI-C at an arrival rate
guaranteeing negligible blocking probability (i.e., Zipf α =
0.8 and λ = 1 req/sec), to provide a fair comparative analysis
between the considered approaches. We assume the network
topology shown in Fig. 5 with cache locations highlighted.
We fix the size of caches located at metro-aggregation nodes
and those located at metro-core nodes to 5% and 10% of the
overall content catalogues size (of all content catalogues of
all CPs).
B. DISCUSSION
1) ISP’S RESOURCE OCCUPATION AND CACHING HIT-RATE
In this section, we show the comparison of popularity-driven,
resource-occupation-driven and static subdivisions consider-
ing the overall network RO and the Hit-Rate measured by the
ISP for increasing Tcol .
First, we depict the RO obtained with the former
approaches as a percentage of the RO measured when the
static subdivision is enforced (which is equal to ∼ 760 ·
106Mbit if K = 5 CPs and ∼ 713 · 106Mbit if K = 10
CPs). The ROROstatic as a function of Tcol is depicted in Fig. 6(a)
and Fig. 6(b), for the scenarios with 5 and 10 CPs, respec-
tively. We remind that an approach is preferable to the ISP
if it reduces the RO measured within its network. We note
that both the popularity-driven and the resource-occupation-
driven subdivision lead to a remarkable RO gain with respect
to the static subdivision. In both the scenarios under analysis,
the minimumRO is obtained when the storage of the caches is
divided according to the popularity-driven subdivision. More
specifically, the minimum RO is obtained with Tcol = 10
minutes and at Tcol = 50 minutes when 5 CPs and 10
CPs are considered, respectively. This result confirms that
the effectiveness of caching highly depends on information
about contents’ popularity and motivates the adoption of our
protocol as a tool to keep this information private.
In general, we observe a RO increase for increasing Tcol .
This fact can be explained considering that high values of Tcol
allow the ISP to obtain more information (e.g., about con-
tents’ popularity), but, at the same time, increases the number
of changes that contents’ popularity undergo during Tcol .
This increase is much more evident in the popularity-driven
subdivision, with such percentage going from ∼ 50.9% to
∼ 53% when Tcol passes from 10 to 100 minutes, whereas
the percentage increases only slightly and it is mostly sta-
ble around ∼ 51% when the resource-occupation-driven
subdivision is employed. This difference between the two
approaches is due to fact that our protocol introduces a delay
between the computation of the popularity-driven subdivi-
sion and its actual enforcement. This delay increases with
increasing Tcol and this may make the computed storage
subdivision out-of-date with respect to the current popularity
patterns (we elaborate further on the dependency between this
delay and Tcol in Section VII-B.3). The conflicting effects
of increasing Tcol are more visible in Fig. 6(a), where it
is possible to observe that the RO of the popularity-driven
subdivision decreases until the minimum value is reached (at
Tcol = 50 minutes) and then increases up to the maximum
(at Tcol = 100 minutes).
Fig. 7 shows the Hit-Rates measured at the caches
located in the metro-aggregation level (i.e., the percent-
age of requests served from the caches closer to the
users). Obtained results are consistent with the RO previ-
ously described: (i) the Hit-Rates of popularity-driven and
resource-occupation-driven subdivisions significantly out-
perform the static subdivision and (ii) the RO decreases
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FIGURE 6. Resource Occupation vs Tcol obtained with the popularity-driven and with the resource-occupation-driven subdivisions divided by
the RO achieved with the static subdivision.
FIGURE 7. ISP’s Hit-Rate (measured at metro-aggregation caches) vs Tcol obtained with the popularity-driven, the resource-occupation-driven
and the static subdivisions.
(resp., increases) when the Hit-Rate increases (resp.,
decreases). The maximum Hit-Rates obtained with a
popularity-driven subdivision are higher than the benchmarks
in both scenarios. For example, in the scenario with 5 CPs,
the maximum Hit-Rates for the popularity-driven and for the
resource-driven subdivision are ∼ 0.45 and ∼ 0.44, respec-
tively (see Fig. 7(a)). When instead 10 CPs are considered,
the corresponding values are ∼ 0.436 and ∼ 0.428 (see
Fig. 7(b)).
2) HIT-RATES FOR THE CPs
According to our vision of NN an ISP should maximally
benefit from the application of caching strategies, as long
as they are not discriminatory towards the CPs. Therefore,
we believe that the ISP is entitled to decide how frequenty
the protocol is executed (i.e., by setting Tcol to the value that
minimizes the RO). However, since the value that minimizes
the RO is not necessarily the one that maximizes the hit-ratio
of every CP, CPs may experience a loss in their hit-ratio.
We formally define this loss as:
Lk =
hˆ(k) − hˆ(k)isp
hˆ(k)
, 1 ≤ k ≤ K (4)
where hˆ(k) is the maximum Hit-Rate that the k-th CP would
obtain if it selfishly selected Tcol , while hˆ
(k)
isp is the Hit-Rate
that it actually experiences according to the decision taken by
the ISP. Notice that such hit-rates refer to the cumulative hit-
rates of metro-aggregation and metro-core caches (i.e., it is
the overall percentage of requests that the CPs serve from the
area of the ISP).
In Tab. 2, we show the loss for each CPs of the first scenario
described in the previous Section (5 CPs with an average
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FIGURE 8. Global popularity of the contents VS Popularity of the contents within the catalogue of the owner CP.
TABLE 2. Loss of CPs’ Hit-Rates when CPs offer contents with
significantly-different popularity.
number of contents of 5000 and contents’ popularity dis-
tributed as shown in Fig. 8(a)). We notice that the loss highly
varies among the CPs that, in this scenario, offer contents
of significantly different popularities (e.g., CP1’s contents
are much more popular, on average, than CP5’s contents).
For instance, the loss goes from a minimum of ∼ 0.5% to
a maximum of ∼ 27.6%, which are experienced by CP1
and CP5 (the CP with the most and the least catalogues on
average, respectively). In the considered scenario, there is
a clear difference of popularity among the CPs. To under-
stand the impact that popularity difference has on the loss,
we perform additional simulations on a second scenario in
which the contents’ popularity is much more similar among
the CPs. Also in this second scenario there are 5 CPs offering,
on average, 5000 contents. The distribution of contents’ pop-
ularity is derived setting σ1 = σ2 = 15000 and it is depicted
in Fig. 8(b). The loss of each CP in this second scenario is
presented in Tab. 3, from which we can observe that the loss
goes from a minimum of 0% to a maximum of 1.65% and it
is therefore much less significant than in the previous case.
From this comparison, it becomes evident that the difference
in CPs’ popularity highly affects the loss experienced by the
CPs. This can be explained considering that the hit-ratios of
the CPs do not significantly vary with changing the storage
subdivision (as a result of tuning Tcol) if the CPs cache
TABLE 3. Loss of CPs’ Hit-Rates when CPs offer contents with similar
popularity.
contents with similar popularity. Hence, the hit-ratios of the
single CPs do not strongly depend on Tcol (i.e., the hit-ratios
are similar and close to the optimum one regardless the Tcol
chosen by the ISP). We therefore conclude that the CPs are
strongly penalized by being inhibited to select Tcol only if
their attractiveness towards the users is significantly different.
3) COMPLEXITY OF THE PROTOCOL AND VOLUME OF THE
EXCHANGED DATA
We now provide an evaluation of the data overhead intro-
duced in all the phases of the execution of the protocol, as well
as the time needed to perform them.
The secure computation of the average size of CPs’ con-
tents’ sˆ is the only operation executed with our protocol that
does not require the use of SSS. The k-th CP 1 ≤ k ≤
K sends to the RA the values of its number of contents
Nk and the overall size of its catalogue Sk encrypted using
the Paillier cryptosystem. Then, the RA decrypts these val-
ues and communicates to the ISP the ratio between them,
i.e., sˆ =
∑K
k=1 Sk∑K
k=1Nk
. This operation requires the exchange of
2K messages between the CPs and the RA, and the exchange
of one piece of data between the RA and the ISP. As all
such data have negligible size (i.e., in the order of the hun-
dreds of bits) and their computation is not time-consuming,
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TABLE 4. Overhead of data exchanged during the execution of the
protocol (being φ the bit-length representation of the shares exchanged
among the parties).
the introduced time and data overhead can be considered
negligible.
Let us now consider all the remaining operations, which
are based on SSS. We refer to φ = b(log2 q+ 1)c to indicate
the bit-length representation of a share ∈ Zq. The secure
computation of the multiplication triple (JaK, JbK, JcK such
that c = a · b) requires the ISP and the RA to exchange 4φ
bit (to obtain JaK, JbK in a distributed manner) and other 6φ
to obtain JcK. The reader is referred to [19] for an in-depth
understanding of all the required exchanges.
The collections of the shares relative to N requests issued
during Tcol requires the following exchange of data: 2Nφ
(to account for the shares sent by the CPs to the ISP
and the RA) and Nφ for the shares of 1s sent from the
RA to the ISP (to account for the value associated with
each request). The next phase requires N logN equality
tests to perform the aggregation of the collected shares and(N
2
) +N comparison operations to compute the ranks of the
contents and to compare them with the size of the cache.
Each equality operation requires the exchange of 2φ2 (which
need to be exchanged during the execution of the protocol,
i.e., online) and 12φ2 (which can be pre-computed and trans-
mitted before the execution of the protocol, i.e., offline) bits,
while the comparison operation requires 18φ2 bits exchanged
on-line [14].
Then, the ISP and the RA compute the random value
rv in a secure and distributed fashion and use it to obtainJrv · zk · ScK and Jrv ·∑Kj=1 zjK. This operations require the
exchange of 18φ (2φ for the computation of rv and 16φ
needed for the multiplications). Successively, the RA sends
the obtained shares Jrv·zk ·ScKRA and Jrv·∑Kj=1 zjKRA to theK
CPs, which requires 2Kφ additional transmitted bit. Finally,
the ISP exchanges with the CPs their shares to obtain γk , and
this results in an additional exchange of 4Kφ bits. In Table 4,
we show the amount of data (in bits) exchanged by the three
entities in a round of execution of the protocol.
From these considerations, it results that the addi-
tional time overhead Top is given by the following
formula:
Top = N logN · τeq +
(
N !
(N − 2)!2! + N
)
· τcomp (5)
where τeq and τcomp refer to the time required to per-
form an equality and a comparison operation, respectively.
FIGURE 9. Time needed to perform the operations on the shares vs Period
of collection of the shares (an arrival rate λ = 1 req/s is considered).
By discarding the operations that can be performed offline,
we obtained τeq ' 0.47 ms and τcomp = 0.68 ms on a
Intel Core I7 computer. A representation of the time overhead
needed to perform operations on the shares (i.e., Top) as a
function of Tcol is depicted in Fig. 9.
Concerning the overhead introduced by the execution of
the protocol, the volume of data exchanged with the CPs can
be considered negligible. Conversely, the overhead of data
exchanged between ISP and RA grows quadratically with the
number of requests issued during the collection phase and
with the bit-length representation of the shares (i.e., φ). With
φ = 13 bits, it is possible to generate unique shares during a
collection phase that lasts up to 135 minutes, considering an
arrival rate of 1 req/s. With these parameters, we obtain an
overhead of ' 2.2Gb online and ' 5Mb offline considering
Tcol = 80 minutes. This overhead drops to ' 1.2Gb when
Tcol = 60 minutes and to' 138Mb when Tcol = 20 minutes.
This overhead is acceptable, especially considering the traffic
reduction achievable by the ISP. Remarkably, low values of
Tcol does not only guarantee the lowest data overhead, but
also the lowest RO (as results from the analysis described
in Section VII-B.1). Moreover, the negative impact of such
overhead may be further reduced by colocating the RA with
the ISP (e.g., as a virtual machine). We stress on the fact that
the popularity-driven subdivision needs to be computed for
each cache storage. In this work, we consider that the storage
size can be of two types only: capacity of metro-core nodes
and capacity of metro-aggregation nodes (i.e., 10% and 5%
of the total size of the CPs’ catalogues, respectively). Hence,
the considered overhead needs to be accounted twice. Notice,
however, that this overhead is still acceptable, and it would be
acceptable even if more possibile caches’ capacity was avail-
able. For example, if 10 types of cache sizes were present,
it would be required to execute the protocol 10 times. This
would imply, considering Tcol = 60 minutes, an overhead
of 12 Gb, which is ∼ 4 times the average size of the CPs’
contents in our simulations.
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VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a privacy-preserving network-
neutrality-compliant protocol for caching of VoD contents in
ISP networks. The protocol guarantees that the ISP assigns
portions of its caches’ storage to several CPs proportionally
to the popularity of their contents (i.e., popularity-driven sub-
division) and it is therefore compliant with neutrality require-
ments recently proposed in the literature. Besides ensuring a
NN-compliant caching, the protocol also allows to meet CPs’
and ISP’s privacy requirements, as the information about
contents’ popularity and size of cache are not disclosed.
We evaluated how caching performance is influenced by
a popularity-driven-subdivision in terms of overall network
resource occupation and hit-ratio for ISP and CPs comparing
it to baseline approaches, namely, static subdivision, where
CPs are assigned the same amount of storage independent of
their popularity, and resource-occupation-driven, where CPs
are assigned an amount of storage according to amount of
capacity their requests occupy in ISP’s network. To this aim,
we developed a dynamic VoD content caching and distribu-
tion simulator. We found that the popularity-driven and the
resource-occupation-driven subdivisions lead to a reduction
of the RO of up to ∼ 52% (and to an improvement of the
hit-ratio of up to ∼ 32%) with respect to the static sub-
division. In particular, the minimum RO and the maximum
hit-ratio are obtained with the popularity-driven subdivision
computed with our protocol. Moreover, we observed that the
RO is highly-influenced by the frequency of execution of the
protocol, that we assume to be tuned by the ISP in order to
minimize the RO. Numerical results show that each CP expe-
riences a loss in terms of its hit-ratio with respect to the case
where it could selflishly establish this frequency. In the con-
sidered scenarios, this loss can range from a minimum of 0%
to a maximum of∼ 27% and it is much less significant when
CPs’ popularity are similar. Overall, our protocol proved to
be beneficial in increasing caching performance (e.g., RO is
reduced) while ensuring the protection of privacy. Note that
privacy is protected also using the benchmark approaches,
but none of them guarantees that the subdivision is actually
compliant with NN requirements (as our protocol, instead,
ensures). We also evaluated the data overhead introduced by
the protocol andwe conclude that it is acceptable compared to
the reduction of RO experienced by the ISP. As a future work,
we plan to extend our study considering more challanging
security models (e.g., malicious parties that can alter their
data during the execution of the protocol).
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